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Abstract 
Botnets are used for various purposes, most of them related to illegitimate activity, being also the sources of massive exploit 
activity as they recruit new vulnerable systems to expand their reach. Due to their volume, diverse capabilities and robustness, 
botnets pose a significant and growing threat to enterprise networks and to the Internet itself. Detecting botnets is a hard task and 
traditional network security systems are unable to successfully complete it. In fact, botnets are evolving and can be quite flexible: 
the protocols used for Command and Control (C&C) evolved from traditional IRC to others and the structure moved from 
centralized to distributed, using for example the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) communication paradigm. So, new generation botnet 
detection systems should be independent of the C&C protocol, botnet structure, infection model and resilient to the change of 
C&C server addresses. In addition, they should use all available information (from network probes, servers, routing elements, 
traffic statistics, identification of illicit applications), correlating it in the most useful way. Characterizing existing botnets is 
crucial to design and efficient detection methodology. Several approaches can be taken to study this phenomenon: analyze its 
source code, which can be a hard task mainly due to license restrictions; study of the botnet control, particularly the activity of its 
C&C server(s); study of the botnet behavior, namely its possible scanning activities, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, spamming 
or phishing activities, among other possibilities. This work will mainly use the last two approaches to characterize (i) the traffic 
generated by each bot when communicating with the C&C server(s) and (ii) identify and analyze the main patterns of the botnet 
generated traffic. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent growth of botnet activity in cyberspace has attracted the attention of the research community. Botnets 
have become one of the biggest security threats, responsible for a large volume of malicious activities such as 
launching Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, sending spam, trojan and phishing emails, illegally 
distributing pirated media and software, stealing information and computing resources, ebusiness extortion and 
identity theft.  
The concept of botnet refers to a collection of infected computers, the bots, that interact to accomplish some 
distributed task for illegal purposes. Bots are controlled by an attacker, also known as botmaster, through various 
command and control (C&C) channels. These channels can operate on different communication protocols and use 
various topologies: centralized, distributed hybrid or randomized. According to their C&C architecture, botnets can 
be classified as IRC-based, HTTP-based, DNS-based or Peer to Peer (P2P). The critical difference between botnets 
and other malware is that botmasters use a C&C to coordinate large numbers of individual bots to launch potentially 
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much more damaging attacks. Botmasters also evolve their C&C strategies and methods very rapidly to evade 
defenders’ countermeasures.  
From a defender’s perspective, it is very important to understand the trends and practices of botnets. There are 
several approaches to study the botnet phenomenon: analyze its source code, study its control (particularly the 
activity of its C&C server(s)) and study its behavior by allowing a selected machine to become infected by an 
executable bot and analyzing all possible scanning activities/actions triggered by the botnet. In this work, we will 
mainly use the last two approaches in order to characterize the traffic generated by each bot when communicating 
with the C&C server(s) and identify and analyze the main patterns of the generated traffic. Specifically, we have 
installed some of the most popular botnets (by allowing the infection of some selected machines or strategically 
placing some honeypots) in order to characterize the traffic generated (and the exchanged commands) when 
communicating with the C&C server(s) and analyze the main patterns of the botnet activity. The generated traffic 
was captured and processed a posteriori in order to have a set of parameters that characterize the collected C&C 
traffic flows. An analysis of the correlation that can exist between the different flows was also conducted in order to 
understand if they belong to similar applications, have some casual relationship or result from communications 
between a single transmitter and multiple receivers. The results obtained show that there are some distinct features 
between different types of botnets, allowing the detection of their activities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some of the most relevant related work on botnet 
characterization and detection approaches; Section 3 describes the characterization methodology that was used in 
this work; Section 4 presents and discusses the main results that were obtained and, finally, Section 5 presents the 
main conclusions.  
2. Related work on botnet characterization and detection approaches  
Several studies have been conducted in order to detect and understand how botnets work. Setting up and 
installing honeypots on the Internet was very helpful to capture malware and understand the basic behavior of 
botnets [1,2,3]. These reference provide an in-depth measurement study of botnet activities by conducting a multi-
faceted approach to collect bots and track botnets; in [4], authors have conducted several basic studies of botnet 
dynamics and in [5] the authors proposed to use the DNS sink holing technique to study botnets, pointing out the 
global diurnal behavior of these networks. So, honeypots are mostly useful to understand botnet technology and 
characteristics, but do not necessarily detect bot infections. 
Botnet detection techniques based on passive network traffic monitoring and analysis have also been useful: these 
techniques can be classified as signature-based, anomaly-based, DNS-based and mining-based. Signature-based 
detection techniques (like Snort [6], for example, which is an open source intrusion detection system (IDS)) can be 
used for detecting known botnets, but are not useful for unknown bots.  
Anomaly-based detection techniques attempt to detect botnets based on several network traffic anomalies, such 
as high network latency, high volumes of traffic, traffic on unusual ports and unusual system behavior that could 
indicate the presence of malicious bots in the network. Several anomaly-based detection approaches have been 
proposed, combining TCP-based anomaly detection with IRC tokenization and IRC message statistics [7], analyzing 
flow data at the transport layer [8] or employing several correlation analysis algorithms to detect spatial-temporal 
correlation in network traffic [9]. However, if anomalous traffic is similar to normal traffic or the C&C traffic has a 
low to medium volume and does not cause high network latency, anomaly-based techniques are not useful to 
identify botnet C&C traffic. 
DNS-based detection techniques are based on particular DNS information generated by a botnet. In order to 
access the C&C server, bots perform DNS queries to locate the respective C&C server. Thus, it is possible to detect 
botnet DNS traffic by monitoring and detecting DNS traffic anomalies [5,10,11,12,13]. 
Several data mining techniques, including machine learning, classification and clustering can be used to 
efficiently detect botnet C&C traffic. In [14], Geobl and Holz proposed Rishi, mainly based on passive traffic 
monitoring for unusual or suspicious IRC nicknames, IRC servers, and uncommon server ports. In [15], Strayer et 
al. showed that evidence of botnet command and control activity can be extracted from flow characteristics using 
passive traffic analysis. Reference [16] suggested a machine learning based approach for botnet detection using 
some general network-level traffic features of chat-like protocols such as IRC. Although these techniques are 
effective to detect some botnets, they are specific to IRC-based botnets and require access to the payload content, 
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being unable to detect encrypted C&C traffic. Masud et al. [17] proposed robust and effective flow-based botnet 
traffic detection by mining multiple log files. This method does not impose any restriction on the botnet 
communication protocol and is therefore applicable to non-IRC botnets. Besides, it does not require access to 
payload content. Botminer [18] applies data mining techniques for botnet C&C traffic detection: it clusters similar 
communication traffic and similar malicious traffic, performing cross cluster correlation to identify the hosts that 
share both similar communication patterns and similar malicious activity patterns.  
However, botnets are evolving and can be quite flexible: the protocols used for C&C evolved from IRC to others 
and the structure moved from centralized to distributed (using P2P, for example). Thus, next generation botnet 
detection systems that are independent of the C&C protocol, botnet structure and infection model and are resilient to 
the change of C&C server addresses are needed. In addition, they should require no a priori knowledge of specific 
botnets and should use all available information (from network probes, servers, routing elements, traffic statistics, 
identification of illicit applications), correlating it in the most useful way.  
3. Characterization methodology 
There are several approaches to study the botnet phenomenon: analyze its source code, which can be a hard task 
mainly due to license restrictions; study its control, particularly the activity of its C&C server(s); study its behavior 
by allowing a selected machine to become infected by an executable bot and analyzing all possible scanning 
activities, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, spamming or phishing activities, or any other action that can be 
triggered. In this work, we will mainly use the last two approaches to characterize the traffic generated by each bot 
when communicating with the C&C server(s) and identify and analyze the main patterns of the generated traffic. 
At the beginning of the botnet expansion phase, the IRC protocol was the most used, mainly due to its 
implementation simplicity. Agobot, RxBot and SDBot are the most popular IRC botnets [19]. P2P botnets are 
distributed by nature and represent an evolution of the botnet structure to become more resilient to defensive 
measures. Several bots with the ability to build a P2P distributed botnet have appeared since 1993, like for example 
EggDrop, Sinit, Phatbot, Peacomm and Heloag. Recently, botnets based on a hybrid network topology have 
appeared, being even more robust to defensive actions. HTTP botnets are based on the HTTP protocol and each bot 
contacts the C&C server at regular and configurable intervals. Besides, this type of botnet also tries to hide their 
traffic behind legitimate network activity. Zeus and SpyEye, for example, are HTTP botnets dedicated to steal 
personal information, while other HTTP botnets essentially aim to send spam messages (like Rustock, for example). 
These botnet examples were characterized in detail in this work, and the main results obtained are presented in 
Section 4. 
We have installed some of the most popular botnets (by allowing the infection of some selected machines or 
strategically placing some honeypots) in order to characterize the traffic generated (and the exchanged commands) 
when communicating with the C&C server(s) during normal activity periods. The generated traffic was captured 
using wireshark [20] and processed a posteriori. Figure 1 illustrates the data measurement/collection framework. 
The main parameters of the C&C traffic flows that were collected/calculated are: the flow starting/ending instant, 
the flow protocol, the number of active flags on TCP flows, the number of exchanged packets per flow, the number 
of exchanged bytes per flow, the flow duration, the flow starting entity (server or client), the average number of 
bytes per packet, the number of successful connections with the C&C server, the number of DNS queries and the 
periodicity between communications with the C&C server. Finally, an analysis of the correlation that may exist 
between the different flows is also conducted in order to understand if they belong to similar applications (like 
applications that transfer bulk-data), if there is some casual relationship between them (that can denote the presence 
of the stepping stone or cascade effect) or if there is a single transmitter and multiple receivers (a kind of multicast 
data dissemination). 
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Fig. 1. Framework for measurement of botnets traffic and inference of the most important statistics. 
 
An interesting finding was the detection of the Fast Flux technique on some botnet types. This technique is used 
by botnets like Storm Worm, Zeus or SpyEye to hide compromised sites, like phishing or malware distribution sites, 
through a constantly changing network composed by compromised hosts that act like proxies. The basic idea behind 
Fast flux is to have numerous IP addresses associated with a single fully qualified domain name, where the IP 
addresses are swapped in and out with extremely high frequency, through changing DNS records. The simplest type 
of fast flux is characterized by multiple individual nodes within the network registering and de-registering their 
addresses as part of the DNS A (address) record list for a single DNS name. A more sophisticated type of fast flux is 
characterized by multiple nodes within the network registering and de-registering their addresses as part of the DNS 
Name Server record list for the DNS zone. Within a malware attack, the DNS records will normally point to a 
compromised system that will act as a proxy server, preventing some of the traditionally best defense mechanisms 
from working (Figure 2). 
 
     
Fig. 2. Comparison between normal and Fast Flux networks. 
4. Results 
The first two bots that were installed are: a simple unencrypted IRC bot, whose IRC commands are transported as 
plain text, and an encrypted IRC bot where all traffic is encapsulated. The most relevant information that was 
collected/inferred for these botnets is represented in Table 1. These bots simply connected to the IRC channel and 
periodically answered with an IRC Pong to an IRC Ping that was sent by the server. Figure 3 represents the number 
of bytes that were transferred over time for both bots. For the unencrypted bot, the log-Pearson function is the one 
that best matches the PDF of the packet length, whereas the log-logistic function is the most suitable to match the 
empirical data corresponding to the encrypted IRC bot.  
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 Table 1. Data collected/calculated for the IRC bots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Fig. 3. Number of bytes transferred over time for the: (left) unencrypted IRC bot; (right) encrypted IRC bot. 
 
The analysis of the exchanged commands (and ports involved) can be used to detect the activity of unencrypted 
botnets, since packets are transmitted in plain text; for the encrypted case, analyzing the keep alive interactions 
(namely their periodicity) between bots and C&C server(s), looking for characteristic temporal patterns, and 
analyzing the distribution of the packet lengths are the best approaches to detect their activity.  
Five botnets specialized in sending spam were tested by installing their corresponding bots: generic SpamBot, 
Waledac, Bubnix, Rustock A and Rustock with SSL traffic. Table 2 presents the values of the different parameters 
that were collected/calculated for these botnets. 
Table 2. Data collected/calculated for the different spam bots  
Parameter SpamBot Waledac Bubnix Rustock A Rustock with SSL 
Sample duration 00h39m 23h59m 00h16m 16h54m 17h25m 
Location Ukraine Various Various USA USA 
Number of packets 176867 (total) and 850 (C&C) 24013 27506 6651 43289 
Number of bytes 16231222 (total) and 566898 
(C&C) 
3421360 15289632 737474 9702099 
Role Client initialized flow  Client initialized flow  Client initialized flow  Client initialized flow Client initialized flow 
Address of the C&C server 195.190.13.78 Various Various 209.20.130.33 204.45.119.2 
Contacted server port 80 80 80 25 (TCP) and 53 
(DNS queries) 
443 (SSL TCP) 
Client port Non-sequential range between 
1039-4774 
Non-sequential range 
between 1025-5000 
Various Non-sequential range 
between 1160-2456 
Non-sequential range 
between 2504-4958 
TCP session establishment 
attempts 
35 15537 1261 for 168 different 
IPs 
546 10 
Successfully established TCP 
sessions 
35 Variable (from 5 to 74) 1101 for 117 different 
IPs 
72 10 
 
For the generic SpamBot, traffic and SMTP queries are unencrypted and the data volume between the bot and the 
C&C server is very low (Figure 4) when compared to communications with SMTP servers (in this case, the traffic 
volume is very high). HTTP Get requests are made at variable intervals, although always belonging to the range 60-
5. Parameter 6. Unencrypted bot 7. Encrypted bot 
8. Sample duration 9. 01h00m 10. 01h00m 
11. Location 12. USA (Fullerton) 13. USA (Scranton) 
14. Number of packets 15. 258 16. 202022 
17. Number of bytes 18. 10291 19. 12494127 
20. Role 21. Client initialized flow  22. Client initialized flow  
23. Address of the C&C server 24. 72.20.28.246 25. 64.191.30.133 
26. Contacted server port 27. 6667 28. 1998 
29. Client port 30. 1101 31. 1225 
32. TCP session establishment 
attempts 
33. 1 34. 1 
35. Successfully established TCP 
sessions 
36. 1 37. 1 
38. Periodicity 39. 200 s 40. 20 s 
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110 seconds. DNS queries represent about 18% of the total number of packets (19% of the total number of bytes), 
while SMTP traffic correspond to 30% of the total number of packets (44% of the total number of bytes). 
The Waledac botnet was able to send about 1.5 million messages per day, about 1% of all spam traffic. This 
network involves several C&C servers and the transferred data does not present a regular temporal pattern (Figure 
5). So, the detection of this botnet is quite difficult when looking only to data statistics. The high number of TCP 
sessions can be a good indication of the presence of this botnet. 
In the Bubnix botnet, bots contact a high number of IP addresses, located on various geographical locations from 
several continents (Figure 6). The HTTP Get and Post messages have no temporal pattern. The traffic volume is 
quite high during a small time period and the number of successfully established TCP sessions is also high. 
Both variants of the Rustock botnet present a high volume of DNS traffic, when compared to the total traffic 
(Figure 7). Exchanged data has no regular or characteristic temporal pattern, so the detection of these botnets should 
mainly rely on the analysis of the DNS traffic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Spambot activity: number of bytes transferred over time.  Fig. 5. Waledac activity: number of bytes transferred over time. 
 
The ZeuS botnet is specialized on stealing information from infected machines and is currently the botnet that has 
the highest number of infected machines. Several bots were installed, revealing distinct behaviours (Table 3). Bots 
were named according to the Autonomous System (AS) where they are located. Activity always starts by triggering 
a DNS query to resolve for the name of a server; then an HTTP Get is sent in order to retrieve the file with the bot 
functioning commands and, after that, HTTP Post messages are sent periodically.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Geographical location of the contacted IPs – Bubnix. 
 
Fig. 7. Rustock A activity: (left) number of bytes transferred over time; (right) number of DNS bytes transferred over time. 
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The first bot, AS21793 InterWeb Media, was obtained from http://zeustracker.abuse.ch and the data volume 
presents some irregular peaks, which are more spaced than the peaks corresponding to IRC bots (left part of Figure 
8). For the AS6849 JSC UKRTELECOM bot, HTTP Post messages are sent at regular intervals and the behaviour of 
the transferred data volume is quite different from the previous example (right part of Figure 8). For the AS30968 
Infobox.ru bot, activity is also highly irregular, with a small number of bytes transferred. The activity of the fourth 
bot is characterized by a second communication with another C&C server that presents an intense exchange of DNS 
messages (about 79.68% of the total number of bytes that were captured). This activity is quite different from the 
behaviour of a common user, because queries have a much higher persistence. In Fast Flux networks, bots execute 
several DNS operations (with a 5 seconds interval) in order to look for a C&C server (the addresses that are 
attempted are randomly chosen). After establishing the connection with the C&C server, HTTP Get and Post 
requests are made with repeating intervals equal to 2 hours and 30 minutes, respectively. For this bot, the DNS 
activity is intense, while the TCP traffic exchanged with the C&C server is quite low and spaced in time. The 
detection of this kind of botnets should also rely on the analysis of its DNS traffic. 
SpyEye botnets are also specialized on stealing information from infected machines and compete directly with 
ZeuS botnets on functionalities and number of infected machines. Several bots were installed, revealing distinct 
behaviours (Table 4). Bots were also named according to the AS where they are located. 
Table 3. Data collected/calculated for the different ZeuS bots  
Parameter AS21793 
InterWeb Media 
AS6849 JSC 
UKRTELECOM 
AS30968 Infobox.ru AS24965 Ukraine Fast Flux 
Sample duration 02h01m 18h35m 23h58m 23h59m   15h49m 
Location Canada Ukraine Russia Ukraine Poland 
Number of packets 47123 46869 52841 47183 8896 
Number of bytes 4448203 6436449 8212635 4448203 1043126 
Role Client initialized flow  Client initialized flow  Client initialized flow  Client initialized flow  Client initialized flow  
Address of the C&C server 76.76.105.205 195.64.185.123 109.120.157.60 194.1.220.47 195.246.200.129 
Contacted server port 80 80 80 80 80 
Client port Non-sequential range 
between 1056-1119 
Non-sequential range 
between 1083-1320 
Non-sequential range between 
1052-5000 
Non-sequential range between 
1034-1040 
Non-sequential range 
between 1060-1168 
TCP session establishment 
attempts 
30 3851 8691 55 35 
Successfully established TCP 
sessions 
30 3848 3803 19 35 
 
 
Fig. 8. Number of bytes transferred over time: (left) ZeuS AS21793 InterWeb Media; (right) ZeuS AS6849 JSC UKRTELECOM. 
 
The first bot, AS21219 Ukraine, contacted different ports at the C&C server, which is an usual behaviour for 
botnets dedicated to stealing information. The exchanged data volume is moderate (left part of Figure 9) and the 
packet size is lower than 1000 bytes. The second bot contacted two different C&C server addresses, maintaining 
similar activity profiles with both servers. The exchanged data volume over time is highly variable and the 
maximum packet size is equal to 1400 bytes. The activity of the AS49130 SC ArNet Connection SRL bot spreads 
over the whole duration of the experiment (right part of Figure 9), although the volume of the transferred data is 
low. The average packet length is about 200 bytes. Finally, the last bot (identified by the Offensive Computing 
organization as a SpyEye bot) contacted several different IP addresses located on various countries, like the US, 
Russia, India, Ukraine, Germany, Singapore, Kazakhstan, etc. Nevertheless, the contacted port was always port 80, 
which is a different behavior when compared to other SpyEye bots. The activity of this bot also spreads over the 
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whole duration of the experiment, although the volume of the transferred data is low for all contacted servers. So, 
the traffic volume will not be a key feature for the detection of this particular botnet.  
 
Fig. 9. Number of bytes transferred over time: (left) SpyEye AS21219 Ukraine; (right) SpyEye AS49130 SC ArNet Connection SRL. 
Table 4. Data collected/calculated for the different SpyEye bots  
Parameter AS21219 Ukraine AS41947 OAO Webalta AS49130 SC ArNet 
Connection SRL 
Multiple AS 
Sample duration 23h49m 25h09m 16h14m 17h29m 
Location Ukraine Russia Romania Several 
Number of packets 68598 19016 45873 37263 
Number of bytes 5565767 4117545 3961952 3438387 
Role Client initialized flow  Client initialized flow  Client initialized flow  Client initialized flow  
Address of the C&C server 80.91.191.156 91.217.249.168 and 
92.241.162.46 
95.64.9.91 Several 
Contacted server port 8080 at the beginning, 80, 3001 
and 3002 
445 at the beginning, 80 8080 at the beginning, 2200, 80 80 
Client port Non-sequential range between 
1028-5000 
Non-sequential range between 
1145-3635 
Non-sequential range between 
1107-1866 
Non-sequential range between 
1107-1930 
TCP session establishment 
attempts 
6327 265 for the first server; 1469 for 
the second server 
5764 788 
Successfully established TCP 
sessions 
1350 265 for the first server; 1462 for 
the second server 
661 615 
41. Conclusions 
Detecting botnets is almost impossible using traditional network security systems, since botnets are evolving and 
can be quite flexible. So, new generation botnet detection systems should be independent of the C&C protocol, 
botnet structure, infection model and resilient to the change of C&C server addresses, besides using all available 
network information and correlating it in the most useful way. Characterizing existing botnets is crucial to design 
efficient detection methodologies. In this work, we have installed bots belonging to some of the most used botnets in 
order to study their activity, namely the commands that are exchanged between the controlled bots and the C&C 
server(s) and the main patterns of the generated traffic. From the conducted analysis, we can conclude that some 
botnets are easy to detect by looking only to traffic volume statistics, but for others it is necessary to look for the 
number of contacted servers, the ports that are used or the DNS activity that is triggered by the controlled machines. 
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